In literature, (2, n) cheating prevention visual cryptographic schemes (CPVCSs) have been proposed, dealing with the case of dishonest participants, called cheaters, who can collude together to force honest participants to reconstruct a wrong secret. While (2, n)-CPVCSs resistant to deterministic cheating have been presented, the problem of defining (k, n)-CPVCS for any k has not been solved. In this paper, we discuss (3, n)-CPVCS, and propose three (3, n)-CPVCSs with different cheating prevention capabilities. To show the effectiveness of the presented (3, n)-CPVCS, some experimental results are discussed as well.
INTRODUCTION
The cryptographic technique for the visual sharing of secret images, denoted Visual Cryptography (VC) or Visual Secret Sharing (VSS) was firstly proposed in (Naor and Shamir, 1994) . A VC scheme (VCS) is usually implemented as a threshold (k, n) scheme, where a secret image is decomposed into n shadow images (called "shadows") which are then distributed to the n participants. Any set of k participants is enabled to reconstruct the secret image by simply stacking together the shadows they own, while (k1) or fewer participants cannot obtain any secret information. In a (k, n)-VCS, each pixel of the secret image is "expanded" into m subpixels in each shadow, where the value m is called the pixel expansion. Following Naor and Shamir's work, most studies dealt with the pixel expansion of VCS (Cimato et al., 2006; Ito et al., 1999; Kuwakado and Tanaka, 2007; Wang et al., 2011; Yan et al., 2015; Yang, 2004) .
A (k, n)-VCS usually consider honest participants, who can provide correct shadows during the reconstruction phase. However, cheating behaviour occurs in VCS, when some dishonest participants, called cheaters, collude together to forge shadows and force honest participants to reconstruct a wrong secret. Several methods (Horng et al., 2006; Hu and Tzeng, 2007; De Prisco and De Santis, 2009; Hu and Tzeng, 2007; Liu et al, 2011; Tsai et al., 2007) have been proposed to face the cheating problem. In (Horng et al., 2006) , the problem of (n1)-colluder cheating has been defined and a (2, n) cheating prevention VCS (CPVCS) has been proposed by using (2, n+l)-VCS instead of (2, n)-VCS. Horng's (2, n)-CPVCS makes (n1) collusive cheaters harder to predict the structure of the honest participant's shadow, and is immune to deterministic cheating. However, Horng's (2, n)-CPVCS only prevents deterministic cheating for the black secret pixel. De Prisco and De Santis in (De Prisco and De Santis, 2009 ) extend Horng et al.'s work and propose a new (2, n)-CPVCS, which does not allow deterministic cheating for both black and white colors. A (k, n)-CPVCS for any k still remains unsolved.
In this paper, we study the (n1)-colluder cheating problem in (k, n)-CPVCS for k=3. Our (3, n)-CPVCS can prevent deterministic cheating for both black color and white color. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces (k,n)-VCS and reviews the previous (2, n)-CPVCSs. In Section 3, we propose three (3, n)-CPVCSs with different cheating prevention capabilities. Examples in Section 4 are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
RELATED WORKS

(K, n)-VCS
In a black-and-white VCS, each pixel is subdivided into m subpixels in each of n shadows. A (k, n)-VCS uses h 1 black subpixels and (m-h 1 ) white subpixels (denoted as h 1 b(m-h 1 )w) to represent black and white secret pixels, respectively, where 0≤h 0 <h 1 ≤m. The values of h 1 and h 0 are the blackness of black color and white color. Let X be a set of involved participants, and w(v) be the Hamming weight of v. Suppose that M is an nxm matrix. The notation (M|X) defines a |X|xm matrix, which selects the rows of the corresponding participants in X from M. With add(M|X) we denote the OR-ed vector of all rows in (M|X), and with D(M|X) we denote a set including all distribution matrices obtained by permuting all the columns in (M|X). The formal definition of a VCS is then given as follows: Definition 1. A (k, n)-VCS is given by (nxm) black and white base matrices 1 B and 0 B satisfying the following two conditions. The collection C 1 (respectively, C 0 ) is obtained by permuting the columns of the corresponding matrix B 1 (respectively, B 0 ) in all possible ways. When sharing a black (respectively, white) secret pixel, the dealer randomly selects one matrix from C 1 (respectively, C 0 ) and chooses each row of the matrix to a relative shadow.
To easily describe base matrices of VCS, some notations are introduced. The notation  is a matrix, e.g., 3,0 
(2, n)-CPVCS
In (Horng et al., 2006) , authors introduced the problem of (n1)-colluder cheating in (2, n)-VCS, where (n1) cheaters collude together to force the honest participant to reconstruct a wrong secret. Consider as an example, the case of (2, 3)-VCS: If two cheaters (say participants P 1 and P 2 ) collude together, they have S 1 and S 2 and can exactly know the structure of S 3 . Then, they can provide fake shadows 1 S and 2 S , and let P 3 obtain a wrong secret image Ŝ (i.e., 1
3Ŝ
S S   or 2 3Ŝ
S S   ). Horng et al. proposed a (2, n)-CPVCS to make it harder for (n1) cheaters to predict the structure of the other shadow. They adopted (2, n+l)-VCS, where l≥1, instead of (2, n)-VCS. Afterwards, the dealer randomly takes only n out of (n+l) shadows and delivers them to n participants. , ||3 , 1000 1000 1000
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Suppose that blocks B and W are black and white m-subpixel blocks in shadows. Let 1 2  C C P be the probability that cheaters can change the C 1 color block to C 2 color block, where C 1 and C 2  {B, W}. Obviously, from Eq. (1-1), cheaters exactly know the structure of B and W, so that they can apply deterministic cheating on Naor and Shamir's (2, 3)-
S S   VCS (i.e., 1 Consider the case of 2-colluder cheating, where the two cheaters P 1 and P 2 want to fool the honest participant P 3 to get a wrong secret. Suppose that the secret image is a left arrow  . Fig. 2(a) shows the stacked result of (2, 3)-VCS (say S 1 +S 3 ) without cheating, where a left arrow  is correctly recovered. Suppose that two cheaters produce a Fig. 2(b) , cheaters can perform deterministic cheating successfully. However, in Fig. 2(c) , although cheaters can fake a right arrowhead they cannot remove the left arrowhead completely (note: cheaters can only correctly identify the location of "1" of B in the shadow S 3 with 50% probability). If we adopt a leftright arrow  as the faked secret image, where the black areas include all black areas of the left arrow, then the cheating is still successful for (2, 3)-CPVCS (see Fig. 2(d) ).
In ( The cheating prevention approach proposed by De Prisco and De Santis's (2, 3)-CPVCS is briefly described below. Two cheaters P 1 and P 2 have different ways of performing a cheating attack. In the following we show the most effective cheating attack with the maximum
and
. By
respectively, the white block 7B5W is changed to the black block 8B4W in 1 3  S S . As shown in Eq. 
, respectively, so that the black. Block 8B4W is changed to the white block 7B5W in 1 3  S S . As shown in Eq. (5), from S 1 and S 2 , cheaters have the probability 2/3 (see Eq. (5-1)) and 2/4 (see Eq.
(5-2)) to correctly select the column 1 0 0
respectively, where boldface denotes the wrong choices. Finally, the probability 
THE PROPOSED (3, n)-CPVCS
Horng's (2, n)-CPVCS adopts a very simple approach by adding l all-0 columns, but its cheating prevention capability is only effective for the black secret pixel. And, this will be a problem if the secret image allows meaningful forging by only changing W to B. De Prisco and De Santis's (2, 3)-CPVCS solves the weakness of Horng's (2, n)-CPVCS by using a larger pixel expansion, so that cheaters cannot figure out the shadow of honest participant.
In this paper, we use a well-known Naor and Shamir's (3, n) to construct the proposed (3, n)-CPVCS. Our scheme has the same cheating prevention capability like De Prisco and De Santis's (2, n)-CPVCS that is effective for both black and white colors (i.e., (n1) cheaters (say participants P 1 , P 2 , …, and P n1 ) collude together to force the honest participant (P n ) to reconstruct a wrong secret. From Construction 1, the base matrices of (3, n)-CPVCS are given in Eq. (7).The black and white blocks B and W in the reconstructed image are (n+1)B(n+l −3)W and nB(n+l−2)W, respectively. For the white secret pixel (see 0  B in Eq. (6)), (n−1) cheaters exactly know the locations of "1" and "0" in the other shadow. Thus, cheaters can change the white block W to any color block, i.e., 1 
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Cheaters do not exactly know all the locations of "1" and "0", but they do know (n2) locations of "1" and (n1) locations of "0" (see 1  B in Eq. (7)). By this observation, cheaters can produce two forged shadows (say 1 S and 2 S ), from the matrix in Eq. (8), where the underlined "0" and "1" denote the known locations to cheaters (the locations of (n-2) "1" and (n-1) "0"). Every one row and every two rows of the matrix in Eq. (7) are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same matrices with the same frequency. 
Thus, the honest participant does not know that the shadows 1 S and 2 S are fake. In the last (l+1) columns, cheaters do not know the exact location of the single "1" in S n , and they can only achieve the probabilistic cheating. In the last (l+1) columns, there are 
EXAMPLES
Construction 1 has the cheating prevention capability against the modifications of the black color to the white color, while Construction 2 has the cheating prevention capability against the modifications of the white color to the black color. arrow and the rectangle without arrow as secret images, respectively. As shown in Fig. 2(c) , some parts of the right arrowhead still remain. Fig. 2(d) shows that cheaters can fool the honest participant to get the wrong secret  , where the white areas contain all the white areas in  . Example 3. Construct a (3, 4)-CPVCS by Construction 3.
To achieve the minimum pixel expansion, we add 2 (l 1 =2) all-0 columns and 2 (l 2 =2) all-1 columns into Naor and Shamir's (3, 4)-CPVCS to form the (3, 4)-CPVCS with m=10. Base matrices are Cheaters can fake two forged shadows 1 S and 2 S to maliciously modify the black block (7B3W) to the white block (6B4W) with the probability  
S S S
. We use  and  as secret images, so that the cheating attack in Construction 1 and Construction 2 is successful. Fig.  3 shows that Construction 3 can detect both cheatings.
